


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# **The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist In Foreign Internal Defense**

A Monograph  
by  
Major Frank J. Abbott  
Military Intelligence



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School of Advanced Military Studies  
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### ABSTRACT

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1947-1949: LESSONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL ARTIST IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE by Major Frank J. Abbott, USA, 55 pages.

This monograph presents a case study of the efforts of the United States government in helping Greece to defeat its Communist insurgency in the late 1940s. The United States conducted a foreign internal defense mission, providing the Greeks economic and military aid, plus civilian and military advisors.

This monograph centers on the military advice that the United States provided to the Greek military during the period 1947-1949. It begins by reviewing the build-up of the Greek Civil War and the events that lead to the United States' involvement in that conflict. The paper then examines the major campaigns of the war and how political and military events impacted on the outcome of those campaigns. The monograph then concludes with recommendations for operational artists involved in future.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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## I. INTRODUCTION

After World War II, the Greek nation, with its ruined economy and unstable government, faced an increasingly strong Communist insurgency. To help Greece defeat this insurgency, the United States conducted its first foreign internal defense (FID) mission of the Cold War era. From 1947 to 1949, the US provided over \$600 million in economic and military aid to Greece, along with civilian and military advisors. With this assistance, the Greek government crushed the insurgent forces.

The United States' FID mission during the Greek Civil War remains one of the least studied chapters in American military history. From 1949 to 1969, only thirteen articles appeared in professional military journals on the topic.<sup>1</sup> This lack of attention may be because no US combat forces fought in Greece as they did in Korea and Vietnam. The American military mission in Greece provided only equipment, supplies, and advice. What is worthy of study, then, is how these US servicemen helped the Greeks defeat the insurgency without the use of US combat troops.

One may wonder why a study of such FID missions is relevant today. After all, the insurgencies of the Cold War were Communist-inspired. With the Soviet Union gone and Communism discredited worldwide, what is

the need for FID at all?

First, insurgencies will continue despite the fall of Communism. Groups such as Peru's Shining Path are still active. Other narcotics-related organizations in Latin America and South Asia may incite insurgencies in order to replace an existing government with a regime that will tolerate illegal drug activities.

Additionally, despite the fall of the Soviet Union, there are approximately twenty Communist terrorist groups worldwide that could instigate civil unrest.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the eruption of regional unrest throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East may create new nation-states with unstable governments. Insurgency threats to these new governments may emerge from ethnic, religious, or racial groups.

In any of these scenarios, the United States may decide to support a threatened government, but may also determine that the use of US combat forces to restore order is unfeasible or unsuitable. A foreign internal defense mission, then, is a viable option in such cases.

This monograph is a case study of a successful American FID program. The monograph first examines why the civil war began, then reviews how the US became involved. This paper then reviews the military campaigns of the Greek Civil War and how political and



military events impacted on the outcome of those campaigns. The monograph then concludes with several recommendations for operational artists involved in future FID missions.

## II. THE BIRTH OF THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

For an understanding of how the Greek Civil War began, one must look to the politics of Greece in the mid-1930s. King George, Greece's monarch, was fearful of the reforms that the left-of-center parliament would institute. In August, 1936, the king dissolved parliament and appointed General Joannes Metaxas as dictator.

Metaxas was able to rule with an iron hand, having the full support of the king, the army, and much of the Greek bureaucracy. Metaxas instituted policies that suppressed all opposing political parties, especially the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The KKE had to establish a clandestine organization in order to survive.

Any popular opposition to Metaxas dissolved quickly when Italy invaded Greece through Albania on 28 October 1940. The Greek resistance, under the field command of General Alexander Papagos, caused the Italian offensive to stall within five days. A Greek counterattack pushed the Italian forces well back into Albania.

Nazi Germany, feeling compelled to come to Italy's aid, invaded on 6 April 1941. The Greeks who had performed so valiantly against the Italians could not hold against the German onslaught. Within three weeks, the German army occupied all of Greece.

During the Nazi invasion, King George and the rightist Greek government fled the country. The KKE, which had been driven underground by Metaxas's persecution, was now in position to lead the Greek resistance. The KKE understood how to organize and operate covertly.

The KKE first used its organizational skills to establish the National Liberation Front (EAM), a political organization. Avoiding Communist rhetoric, the EAM appealed to Greek nationalism and called for the expulsion of the German invaders. The EAM quickly recruited enough volunteers to form its military arm, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), which began guerrilla-style operations in early 1942.

During this same time, the National Republican Greek League (EDES) also emerged. Unlike the KKE, EDES supported King George and the Greek government-in-exile. Lacking the organizational skills of the EAM, EDES remained relatively small and had to limit its operations to northwest Greece.

It did not take long for ELAS and EDES to develop

a bloody rivalry. Both organizations looked beyond the day of Greek liberation and realized that each would be vying for power. Members of EDES offered the Germans information that allowed them to track down ELAS units.<sup>3</sup> ELAS units conducted small-scale attacks on EDES forces in December, 1942.

Skirmishes continued until October, 1943, when ELAS launched wide-spread attacks on EDES units. Since ELAS had a four-to-one superiority over EDES (20,000 members versus 5,000), these initial attacks were very successful. A combination of overextended ELAS supply lines and emergency British resupply of EDES units allowed EDES to counterattack. By February, 1944, EDES had regained the territory it had lost four months earlier. Both sides then agreed to a truce.

The British, in an attempt to resolve this Greek political conflict, set up a conference in Lebanon in May, 1944. Greek representatives from eight political parties and all resistance organizations attended the four-day meeting. The resulting Lebanon Conference agreement granted EAM one-quarter of the post-war cabinet posts (a total of five). In a conference in Italy four months later, both ELAS and EDES agreed to be under the command of a British general.<sup>4</sup>

The Nazi occupiers began to withdraw from Greece in autumn, 1944, mainly because Germany needed these

troops elsewhere in Europe. The Greek resistance organizations, however, claimed credit for driving out the Germans. British forces and the Greek government-in-exile arrived in Greece in October.

The political fighting among the Greeks, however, quickly began again. Since the government-in-exile fled when the Germans attacked, it lacked credibility with the Greek populace. To many, the returning government was another Metaxas dictatorship and a mere puppet government of the British.

The KKE perceived an opportunity to seize power. Wishing to show its popular support, the EAM held a demonstration in Athens on 2 December despite a government ban. The event turned violent, and several civil police and EAM demonstrators were killed.

After the riot, the British ordered all ELAS units to withdraw from the Athens area within 72 hours. ELAS responded on 6 December by attacking government buildings in Athens and by attacking EDES units in northern Greece. British soldiers had to restore order. However, within days ELAS gained control of all of Greece except in cities where British forces were garrisoned. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered an offensive, which forced ELAS to request an armistice on 11 January 1945.

In the negotiations that followed, ELAS agreed to

surrender its arms within two weeks in accordance with an established quota. In return, the Greek government promised to guarantee civil liberties, grant amnesty, hold free elections, and conduct a plebiscite to decide whether King George would once again assume the throne.

Even though ELAS surrendered more than its quota of weapons, it did not surrender all its arms. British and Greek troops discovered large caches for months afterward. Only later were Greek officials also to discover that close to 40,000 ELAS members and supporters were leaving Greece to receive military training in Yugoslavia."

Meanwhile, British authorities in Greece were busy attempting to rebuild the Greek economy and to halt the right-wing abuses of power. The Greek government suppressed a Communist-inspired revolt in early 1945. A British Parliamentary Legal Mission reported in early 1946 that the Greek government had arrested over 50,000 citizens "in the most arbitrary fashion."<sup>6</sup> It appeared that "extremism of the right had grown alongside extremism of the left. There was no place for moderates in the political life of postwar Greece."<sup>7</sup>

The KKE chose to boycott the elections held in March, 1946, perhaps knowing that it would not make a strong showing. The boycott handed the victory to the right-wing Populist Party. Leftist bands increased

their violent activities in northern Greece during the summer. Hoping that King George could restore order, the Greek people voted for the return of the king in a September plebiscite. The fighting, however, continued.

The US and Great Britain, preferring a more moderate Greek government, were not pleased with the Greek election results. Since an international team of observers certified the fairness of these elections, however, the American and British governments felt obliged to support the victorious candidates.\*

### III. THE UNITED STATES TAKES THE LEAD

In early 1947, Great Britain announced that it no longer could afford to support the Greek government's economic and military needs. The United Kingdom asked the US to take over this financial burden immediately.

After consulting with several key members of his administration, President Harry Truman composed a sweeping policy to gain the support of the American people and of the Congress. In his 12 March 1947 speech before a joint session of Congress, the president announced what became the Truman Policy:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

Truman went on to predict that if Greece fell to the Communists, Turkey and the entire Middle East would

fall as well. He asked for \$400 million in aid for both Greece and Turkey, along with the detailing of US civilian and military personnel to help in Greece's reconstruction effort and defense needs.

Upon Congressional approval of Truman's request, the US War Department formed the US Army Group, Greece (USAGG) to provide military assistance to the Greek government. The law authorized US military personnel broad advisory functions. At the time, however, the War Department believed that the Greek military needed only supplies and equipment, not operational advice. War Department officials, concerned that opponents of the aid program would accuse US military personnel of commanding Greek forces, also prohibited USAGG from sending military observers to combat zones.<sup>10</sup>

USAGG was activated in April, 1947, as a subordinate element of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). USAGG had the authority to coordinate directly with the War Department on purely military matters, but had to request approval from AMAG chief Dwight Griswold for all matters dealing with broader policy issues.<sup>11</sup>

Griswold's mission was particularly delicate. He was never to appear to be intervening in the internal affairs of the Greek government. However, he was to make discreet suggestions about government policy and

organization while allowing all to believe that Greek officials were the true source of any reforms. If Griswold found a senior Greek official to be incompetent or embarrassing, he was to quietly put pressure on the Greeks to force that official's removal.<sup>12</sup> US military officers would later exercise this same policy when dealing with the Greek military and its senior officers.

USAGG's initial tasks were more straight-forward. The group was to determine the supply and equipment needs of the Greek forces and to begin procurement procedures. The first USAGG officials arrived in Greece in May, 1947. Supplies and equipment began to arrive that autumn.

This initial US assistance, however, had no deterrent effect on the guerrilla forces, who now called themselves the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). When Congress debated the Greek-Turkish aid bill, the US estimated the guerrilla strength at 13,000. By the time the first shipments of USAGG supplies arrived the guerrilla strength had almost doubled.<sup>13</sup> The guerrillas, operating in bands of 70 - 100 men, were becoming more aggressive in their raids and sabotage. They chose weakly defended targets, fought bravely against the Greek armed forces, and usually escaped Greek National Army (GNA) attempts to defeat them.



The Greek General Staff (GGS) did have an overall military strategy in 1947. Recognizing that Greece did not have enough armed forces to conduct simultaneous operations throughout the country, the GGS planned to conduct sequential operations from south to north. Each operation would have three phases. In the first phase, Greek forces would conduct a pincer movement in a particular region to trap the guerrilla bands in the area, thus forcing them to surrender or to fight. The second phase, which was to take only a few days, involved mopping-up operations to defeat any remaining rebel elements in the region. In the third phase, the bulk of the armed forces would then proceed northward to the next major region, and begin this process again.

This strategy failed miserably. As Greek forces began an operation, the rebel bands either withdrew from the region or infiltrated out of the pincer trap. The local population refused to cooperate with the Greek army because they feared the guerrillas would return and wreak vengeance. The Greek army thus was forced to create more and more stay-behind forces, which cut significantly into the strength available for subsequent operations.<sup>14</sup>

Greek government attempts to persuade the guerrillas to stop fighting failed also. During 1947, the Greek government announced two amnesty periods.

DAG forces interpreted these offers as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, the Greek government could not guarantee the protection of a former guerrilla or his family from possible rebel retribution.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the situation in the autumn of 1947 appeared bleak. The GNA had so many troops dedicated to static defense missions that it could not pursue the rebel bands. Lacking an effective offensive capability, the Greek armed forces were unable to achieve an outright military victory.

In an attempt to remedy the situation, the US approved a Greek request to increase the GNA by 10,000 men. USACG then proposed what became one of the most significant decisions of the conflict--the formation of the National Defense Corps (NDC). The proposal was to divert the funds allocated for the GNA increase to create twenty 500-man battalions. These battalions, regionally based, were to take over all static defense missions. With the NDC defending towns and critical assets, the GNA would be free to concentrate on offensive missions. Additionally, the local population would become more involved in defending themselves rather than relying on the GNA. The US and Greek governments approved the idea; by the end of 1947, plans called for 100 NDC battalions.<sup>16</sup>

The potential for a Communist victory in Greece,

however, remained great. The Greek military needed more than just equipment and supplies. The sending of US combat troops to fight alongside the GNA was out of the question, since the Truman Administration had assured Congress that there was no intent to do so. The US State Department also ruled out the sending of US troops after a Communist takeover since the world would consider such a move as an invasion.<sup>17</sup>

The problem therefore became how to reverse the grave situation without US combat forces. AMAG chief Griswold and the Greek prime minister proposed that Major General William Livesay, the USAGG commander, be provided a planning staff to give operational advice to the Greek military. After studying the issue, the US War Department, State Department, and National Security Council (NSC) supported the idea.<sup>18</sup> Truman approved the recommendation in November, 1947.

#### IV. THE FORMATION OF JUSMAPG

Upon Truman's approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) on 31 December 1947. General Livesay served as both commander of USAGG and director of JUSMAPG. JUSMAPG provided advisory teams to the GGS as well as teams to the Greek First Army headquarters, to the three Greek corps headquarters, and to the headquarters of the seven Greek divisions.

During this period the guerrillas were not idle. On Christmas Eve, 1947, the guerrilla leader Markos Vafiades announced the establishment of the First Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece in direct defiance to Athens. Since the rebels dominated much of northwest Greece, they held and defended territory that they could call "Free Greece". This announcement, coupled with the failed amnesty programs, convinced both the Greek and US governments that the conflict had "to be settled by military means."<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, even though JUSMAPG was less than one month old, many in Washington believed that someone besides General Livesay needed to be the group's director. In late January, 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall informed Griswold of Marshall's intent to nominate Major General James A. Van Fleet to replace Livesay. Marshall believed Van Fleet to be "a more impressive personality" since he was "one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders" in the European theater of World War II.<sup>20</sup> General Dwight D. Eisenhower, agreeing with Marshall, stated that Van Fleet was "definitely not the intellectual type, but [was] direct and forceful and [had] a fighting record that would make anyone respect him."<sup>21</sup>

After receiving Congressional confirmation and a promotion to lieutenant general, Van Fleet flew to

Athens in mid-February. There were some positive developments. The US and British military missions in Greece had just concluded an agreement on dividing responsibilities. The US would advise on matters of supply, logistics, and operations; the British would oversee matters of Greek military organization and training. Additionally, the British government's ban on British soldiers going into operational areas was lifted. Fifty British field grade officers were soon serving alongside American officers as observers at Greek division and corps levels.

Van Fleet's challenges, however, were many. As historian Howard Jones writes, "The outcome [of the Greek Civil War] rested almost as much on bureaucratic procedures as on successful combat."<sup>22</sup> Van Fleet attempted to spend at least half his time in the field, visiting the Greek soldiers to bolster their fighting spirit. His position, however, demanded that he be in Athens to attend meetings hosted by the US embassy, AMAG, or one of the Greek ministries.<sup>23</sup>

Dealing with the Greek authorities presented many security problems. Since the liberation of Greece, Communists and their sympathizers occupied positions within the Greek government bureaucracy and in the Greek military. Hiding their political affiliations, these subversives passed government secrets to

guerrilla forces and thwarted government functions. Government information often did not reach its intended destination. The bureaucracy was riddled with ineptness and inefficiency. Subversives in the Greek military "were instructed to stay in the Army units and gradually erode them."<sup>24</sup>

The Truman Administration was to find that it had security problems of its own, however. In February, 1948, Truman approved a National Security Council recommendation to continue study on the question of sending US combat troops to Greece.<sup>25</sup> The following month, a US magazine reported that the American military was preparing plans to send up to 25,000 US soldiers and Marines to Greece.<sup>26</sup>

The belief that the US would eventually send its own combat troops to fight in the Greek Civil War created many problems. US officials attempted to convince the American public and the Greek government that the US was not taking over the war. During his November, 1947 announcement of the extension of operational advice to the Greeks, Griswold stated that US officers would "not be taking command" of Greek forces, but that the intent was to help the Greeks "so that they can pick up the job and do it themselves."<sup>27</sup>

Despite such efforts, however, many Greeks still expected the US to send combat forces into the

conflict. One press report noted that the Greek armed forces were not being aggressive "on the theory that the U.S. is committed and will be forced to do the real fighting for them."<sup>28</sup> Another article quoted a Greek lieutenant's response to the question of why his troops lacked fighting spirit:

This war in Greece is a battle between the United States and Russia. It happens that it's being fought here. That is our bad luck. But you can't expect us to fight your battle single-handed--at least not with the old spirit.<sup>29</sup>

The Greeks' perception that they were fighting America's war would continue to cause problems for at least another year.

The problem in Greece was, of course, not the only foreign policy challenge for the US in early 1948. In addition to Greece's civil war, there was a Soviet-led coup in Czechoslovakia, unrest in Palestine, a civil war in China, an increasingly tense situation in Berlin, and the demands of rebuilding the economies of Western Europe. On the domestic front, a public opinion poll showed that 60% of Americans favored the continuation of US aid to Greece, but only 25% favored the dispatching of US troops to Greece even if a Communist takeover were imminent.<sup>30</sup>

The United States, therefore, could not afford to overextend itself in Greece. The Truman Administration, however, decided not to inform the

Greek government of its aversion to sending US combat troops. Secretary of State Marshall had grave concerns that Greek morale would plummet.<sup>31</sup> The Greeks, therefore, continued to believe that the Truman Doctrine had no limits.

Among General Van Fleet's greatest challenges, then, was how to instill a fighting spirit in a dispirited fighting force. The morale of the Greek officer corps was very low due to guerrilla successes and internal Greek politics. Political factions within Greece were attempting to gain control of the GNA to gain political power. Many officers felt "insecure in their positions."<sup>32</sup> Other officers had become heavily involved in politics to ensure that certain political parties would win office and thus promote them.<sup>33</sup> The result was that Greek commanders dared not take any risks for fear of being fired. They therefore were overly cautious. This lack of aggressiveness could cause an entire campaign to fail, but at least no blame could be pinned on them.<sup>34</sup>

Within this environment, Van Fleet prepared an operational plan for 1948. Van Fleet's concept called for sequential campaigns. First, the GNA was to clear the Roumeli region of rebel bands, then launch attacks into the Grammos area by early June. Once the Greek army had cleared Grammos, it would conduct commando



operations to clear DAG forces from the Peloponnese. Next, the GNA would ready itself for a winter campaign in the north (the Vitsi area). Van Fleet, expressing optimism about his plan, stated that as long as no Communist nation intervened with troops, "we will mop up everything in Greece right up to the border this year."<sup>55</sup>

## V. THE CAMPAIGNS

### A. OPERATION DAWN<sup>56</sup>

By mid-April, a force of 2,000 guerrillas controlled the Roumeli region. Guerrilla control of this area cut Athens off from the rest of Greece. GNA control of the region would restore Athens' links with the rest of the country and would allow for the isolation of rebel units in the Peloponnese.

The plan was for the Greek "A" Corps, commanding three divisions and two commando groups, to conduct the operation. On 15 April, the three divisions were to attack abreast from north to south. The two commando groups had the mission to block mountain passes to prevent the guerrillas from escaping northward.

The night before Operation Dawn began, a guerrilla force attacked during a heavy rain and broke through the "B" Commando Group's lines. The guerrillas escaped to the north.

The operation proceeded at a painfully slow pace;

"A" Corps required a full month to clear an area 90 by 50 kilometers. Large numbers of guerrillas had managed to escape "A" Corps' advancing units. However, the operation did succeed in chasing the guerrilla elements out of Roumeli. Most of all, though, the GNA received what it needed most--the chance to claim a victory.

The celebration did not last long, however. During the final days of Operation Dawn, the body of US journalist George Polk was discovered; he had clearly been executed.<sup>37</sup> Right-wing political elements in Greece had declared Polk a KKE sympathizer. Indications were that Polk was en route to conduct a clandestine interview with DAG commander Markos. Did the right-wing kill Polk as a warning to other correspondents? Or, did the KKE murder him in an attempt to smear the Greek government's reputation?

One thing was certain: "In the United States nothing harmed the Greek cause more during this period than the Polk case."<sup>38</sup> The American public could not understand why the murderers could not be caught.

After some months, Greek officials arrested a Communist sympathizer and convicted him of being an accessory after the fact. The Greek government tried and convicted in absentia two hardened Communists of the actual murder. American journalists, suspecting a cover-up, were irate.

Back in Washington, the Truman Administration was once again examining the question of sending US combat troops to Greece. The NSC, citing improvements in the Greek military, recommended against such a deployment. However, the council stated, it would relook the issue before November, 1948 or if the situation in Greece worsened.<sup>39</sup>

#### B. OPERATION CROWN

Operation Crown began on 20 June 1948 with the intent of breaking "the back of the bandit gangs this year."<sup>40</sup> Its objective was to gain complete control of the Grammos Mountain region, the "nerve center of the Communist military forces in Greece." Greek intelligence sources indicated that the estimated 7,500 guerrillas in the area would defend at all costs.<sup>41</sup>

The operation had three phases. First, GNA forces were to clear areas near the guerrilla main base. When these clearing efforts were complete, the Greek army was then to attack and occupy positions along the DAG's outer defensive line. In the third phase, GNA units were to cut the lines of communication between Grammos and Albania, then conduct a general offensive from all directions against DAG's second defensive line.<sup>42</sup>

Markos, however, knew of the GNA's plans well in advance and reinforced the two defensive lines. In the Epirus region, he kept a 3,000 man force; its mission

was to cut the GNA's supply lines once the GNA launched its offensive."

The GNA launched its attack on 20 June. The going was tough and slow--the Greek army was battling over mountainous terrain against a well-prepared defense. Markos's Epirus force harassed the GNA rear areas, forcing the GNA to dedicate units to hunt the raiders.

Nonetheless, Van Fleet determined that the slowness of the operation was due to the incompetence of the "B" Corps commander. On 27 July, Van Fleet recommended that a new corps commander be appointed. The Greek prime minister concurred, but then asked Van Fleet himself to name the new commander. Van Fleet, perhaps knowingly accepting the prime minister's challenge, nominated the GGS chief of operations, Lieutenant General Stylianos Kitrilakis. GGS agreed.

On the seventeenth day of Operation Crown, the GNA finally seized the outer defensive line; phase three could at last begin. After twelve more days of hard fighting, Markos ordered a retreat. The overwhelming numbers of the GNA were at last threatening him from both flanks. Some rebels fled to Albania, while the bulk of the rebel force, some 8,000 men, headed towards Vitsi." The GNA's inability to rapidly close a planned pincer movement once again allowed DAG forces to escape.

Despite the slowness of the operation and the escape of the guerrillas, there was much optimism in the US government after Operation Crown. Van Fleet warned, however, that 17,000 rebels remained in Greece. The war was not yet over.<sup>45</sup>

On 21 August Operation Crown officially ended. The GNA left one division in Grammos to prevent guerrilla reoccupation of the area. One reinforced division attacked guerrilla fortifications in the Mourghana region. The next major fight, however, was against DAG forces near Mount Vitsi.<sup>46</sup>

#### C. OPERATION VITSI

Most of the guerrillas that escaped from the GNA's Grammos operation assembled in the area surrounding Mount Vitsi. The Vitsi area offered good rebel supply routes coming out of Albania and Yugoslavia. The region's mountainous terrain favored a guerrilla stronghold defense. Both the GGS and JUSMAPG agreed that if the DAG forces were not expelled from the Vitsi area before winter, the rebels could hold out there well into the spring of 1949.<sup>47</sup>

Elements of "B" Corps, under LTG Kitrilakis, advanced into the Vitsi area and prepared for an attack against the 4,500 guerrillas there. The plan was for the division to attack from the south and from the east. The GGS expected "B" Corps to complete the

operation in forty days.

The initial attack, begun on 30 August, started very slowly due to strong enemy resistance and bad weather. The GGS dispatched two additional brigades and another division headquarters to the region in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough. The attack gradually moved forward; on 5 September GNA units were within two kilometers of cutting off the rebel supply line to Albania.

The situation then changed quickly. DAG forces mounted a strong counterattack and forced the GNA "to retreat in disorder to their original positions." "The GGS responded by dispatching another division to "B" Corps. Before "B" Corps could attack again, however, the rebels launched a spoiling attack that pushed GNA units back three kilometers. "B" Corps regained this ground after two days of fighting.

General Van Fleet was not pleased. LTG Kitrilakis was the man Van Fleet had chosen to instill an aggressive spirit into "B" Corps. Now Kitrilakis' "cautious attitude" was destroying the GNA's chances of clearing the Vitsi region before winter. Van Fleet and the GGS agreed that Kitrilakis had to be relieved." Kitrilakis' replacement, however, could not produce victory either.

As "B" Corps prepared for another attack, DAG

forces took advantage of the time available. The guerrillas continued to strengthen their defensive positions. Partly through the forced recruiting of villages in the area, the guerrillas' strength had grown to 7,000 by 1 October.<sup>50</sup>

GNA forces launched two more major offensives in October. Both attempts were dismal failures, although the Commando Groups did record some sterling successes. By the month's end the GNA suspended any further offensives. The situation in Vitsi had ended in stalemate. DAG, now with a 6,500 man force, still controlled the region.

The American observers in Vitsi concluded that the Vitsi failure was due primarily to the lack of aggressive leadership in the GNA. Brigade and division commanders at times requested permission to withdraw when they met enemy resistance. At other times, GNA units retreated in disorder when DAG units counterattacked. One US officer concluded that GNA officers were either unwilling or unable to command their troops.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, simply relieving a commander did not solve the problem--"B" Corps had three commanders in three months.

As 1948 came to a close, there was little reason for optimism. While the GNA tried in vain to clear the Vitsi area, guerrilla bands increased their activities

in the Thessaly and Peloponnese regions. The rate of forced recruiting replaced almost all of DAG's losses during the year. Therefore, despite suffering 24,000 casualties in 1948, DAG's overall strength was virtually the same as when the year began.<sup>52</sup>

#### D. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION--WINTER, 1948-1949

Given the failure at Vitsi, Van Fleet reassessed the entire situation in Greece.<sup>53</sup> He knew he had to improve the GNA so that it could defeat the rebels, but the time required to do so was not available. To relax the pressure on the DAG would only allow the guerrillas to grow stronger. Meanwhile, many in the US Congress were calling for significant cuts in the Greek aid program. The war had to be won quickly.

A necessary step in winning quickly was to close the guerrilla supply routes from Albania and Yugoslavia. To cut off these routes, however, required either a fast-paced offensive or a drastic increase in the size of the GNA. The speedy assault, of course, was a task the GNA had proven that it could not do. A GNA size increase was a move Washington would not approve; besides, a larger GNA may not have been any more competent than the present one.

In addition, the Truman Administration had reconfirmed its policy of no US combat troops in Greece.<sup>54</sup> Van Fleet, therefore, could not rely on



using American forces to defeat the Communists. He had no option but to continue to provide military aid and operational advice, and hope that the Greeks could find a way to win the war themselves.

Tensions between Greek and American officials grew in late 1948. Upset at the GNA's failures in Vitsi, Van Fleet told several senior Greek officers that he had doubts whether US aid to Greece should continue.<sup>55</sup> The new US ambassador to Greece, Henry Grady, noted that Greek political and military leaders continued to believe that the Greek Civil War was really an international problem, not a Greek internal conflict. Grady recognized that he had to break the Greek belief that Greece "can expect to live indefinitely on American bounty."<sup>56</sup> When a US journalist asked if Grady believed that the Greeks were "holding back" in their war efforts "in order to get more dollars from the U.S.," Grady responded, "No comment."<sup>57</sup>

Meanwhile, the guerrillas were far from idle. While the situation in Vitsi remained a stalemate, DAG slowly reinfiltrated into the Grammos area through two GNA divisions. At least three guerrilla brigades had established strongholds there by late 1948.

In the rest of Greece, guerrilla raids were becoming more frequent and more aggressive. Although NDC units were able to defeat some raids, others were

spectacularly successful. From December 1948 to February 1949, the rebels forcibly recruited over 5,000 Greeks<sup>58</sup> and executed local officials. A Greek woman told a US journalist, "You Americans must put an end to this war--or leave us to the Russians. Between you we are being crucified!"<sup>59</sup>

In early 1949, then, the situation in Greece looked bleak. The guerrillas had a firm hold on the Grammos and Vitsi regions and held the initiative elsewhere in Greece. The US media published gloomy reports, citing the rebels' advantages and the apparently ineffective US aid program. The fortunes of this war, however, were about to change.

On 21 January 1949, General Alexander Papagos, the hero of the Greek-Italian War, was appointed commander-in-chief (CINC) of all Greek armed forces. The idea to bring Papagos out of retirement first came up during the previous October. Although he had the advantages of his prestige and his lack of political party affiliation, Grady expressed concern that a "sort of dictatorship [was] being set up."<sup>60</sup> As the situation in Greece deteriorated, however, Grady saw the need for an effective and efficient Greek government, which was "more important than preserving all traditional democratic forms."<sup>61</sup> The day after another Greek cabinet reshuffle, Papagos took command.

Papagos immediately took drastic measures. His first Order of the Day called for an offensive spirit and stated that failure would not be tolerated.<sup>62</sup> He followed this order with proclamations that irresponsible or passive commanders would be court martialed. He further authorized commanders to shoot anyone who demonstrated cowardice. He also decreed that no unit could pull back from its position without the authorization of its higher headquarters.<sup>63</sup> He then appointed an inspector general "to investigate the tactical errors of commanders."<sup>64</sup>

Relations between Papagos and US officials, however, did not proceed smoothly. At a 5 February War Council meeting, Papagos stated that the Greek armed forces were too small "to do the job which Greece's 'allies' are expecting of Greece." The comment was directed at Grady, who was in attendance. Papagos went on to demand that the GNA be expanded from 132,000 to 250,000 within four months, or he would resign.<sup>65</sup> Although Washington refused to fund such an increase and Papagos did not carry out his threat, the incident demonstrated how Papagos, along with many other prominent Greeks, continued to believe that the war in Greece was in reality a US-USSR conflict.

While Papagos was assuming his new duties as CINC, an operation designed to clear the rebel forces from

the Peloponnese region was already underway. Code-named Operation Pigeon, this effort provided just the decisive victory that the Greek armed forces needed.

#### E. OPERATION PIGEON

While the Greek armed forces were conducting their operations in the Grammos and Vitsi regions, DAG was slowly building its forces elsewhere in Greece. One such build-up was in the Peloponnese region. US officials noted that the Peloponnese was Greece's "sacred homeland," and that the security of that region was essential to the morale of the Greek soldier.<sup>66</sup>

In early 1948 there were only 800 guerrillas in the region; by the end of the year that figure had grown to 4,000. The intensity of the fighting in the Grammos and Vitsi regions did not allow the GNA to send reinforcements into the Peloponnese. This reality caused conflict within the Greek government; some Peloponnese government officials resigned in protest.<sup>67</sup>

The winter stalemate in the northern areas offered the chance to clear the Peloponnese region. The operation began on 19 December 1948 with GNA forces securing the coast along the Gulf of Corinth to prevent the guerrilla bands from being resupplied by sea. The Greek "A" Corps commander then made his most decisive move; he ordered the arrest of some 4,500 suspected Communist collaborators in the area. These arrests

deprived the guerrilla bands of their principal means of supplies and intelligence. The mass arrests also helped to gain the cooperation of the local population, which had been reluctant to provide information to the Greek armed forces for fear of guerrilla reprisals."

Since "A" Corps did not have enough troops to conduct simultaneous operations throughout the region, Operation Pigeon had two main phases. In the first phase, the main effort was to clear the northern part of the region and a supporting effort aimed to neutralize guerrilla activity in the south. The second phase called for the main effort to begin to clear the region from north to south. During both phases, the Greek navy was to conduct a sea blockade to prevent the rebel bands from receiving reinforcements by sea and to prevent a rebel withdrawal by sea."

The execution of Operation Pigeon was virtually flawless. The rebel bands, cut off from their intelligence sources, had great difficulty trying to avoid GNA forces. Although some bands had limited success conducting counterattacks, "A" Corps units relentlessly pressured and pursued these bands. The operation was deliberately slow and methodical in order to allow no rebel escape. By the end of March, only 250 rebels remained in the region."

The tide was turning in the war. Apparently

disturbed by the GNA's success in the Peloponnese, DAG launched an attack on the town of Karpenissi on 19 January. The rebels occupied the town in an obvious effort to tempt Papagos to divert units from the Peloponnese. Papagos would not take the bait; the town remained under DAG occupation for 15 days until GNA units from other areas ejected the rebels.<sup>71</sup>

On 27 January, while Karpenissi was still under occupation, the Provisional Government of Free Greece made a radio broadcast announcing a peace proposal. The proposal called for a cease-fire, a general amnesty, and negotiations to form a new government that would hold elections within two months.<sup>72</sup> At first, this announcement seemed to be a logical step after the aggressive raiding that DAG had conducted over the previous two months--they could now, theoretically, bargain from a position of strength.

One week later, however, another Provisional Government broadcast announced that Markos, the guerrilla leader, had been relieved of all his military and KKE duties because of his ill health. Days later, another broadcast stated that six high ranking DAG leaders had been removed for their "opportunism."<sup>73</sup> Clearly, Markos and his followers were being purged.

What US and Greek government officials did not fully understand at the time was that there existed a

great personal animosity between Markos, the military commander, and Nikos Zahariadis, the head of the KKE. Markos had been a proponent of keeping DAG a guerrilla-based force, conducting raids and avoiding decisive combat with Greek armed forces. Zahariadis, however, pushed for converting DAG into a conventional force that could seize and hold terrain and could engage and defeat the GNA. Another point of contention was the issue of Macedonia; Zahariadis favored an autonomous Macedonia, while Markos opposed that policy.<sup>74</sup> With Markos and his followers out of the KKE and the DAG, Zahariadis now had free reign.

Zahariadis' initial step was to announce the new KKE policy that Macedonia should be independent within the framework of a Balkan federation. The immediate result was a large increase in volunteers of Macedonian origin. The influx of these volunteers brought the total of Slavo-Macedonians in DAG to 14,000, or two-thirds of the rebel army's strength.<sup>75</sup> However, "the truly popular basis of the Greek guerrilla movement [was] destroyed."<sup>76</sup> The rebels were no longer fighting for a better Greece, but to divide Greece.

The KKE's Macedonian policy also had international repercussions. The move angered Yugoslavia to the point that Tito, the head of the Yugoslavian government, began to cut off support to DAG. The

decrease was not significant until spring 1949, but by June there was no aid at all. On 10 July, Tito announced that his border with Greece was closed."

As these events unfolded, JUSMAPG worked to compose its campaign plans for 1949. In late March, Van Fleet hosted a conference with the British Military Mission. Van Fleet's proposal was to shift the focus from clearing regions to defeating DAG formations. His proposal included changing from sequential to simultaneous operations "over a wide area in order to prevent the enemy from evading the GNA attacks." The next major offensive, he argued, should be an attack on guerrilla units in central Greece, then an offensive against DAG forces in the Grammos-Vitsi area. Van Fleet emphasized that once the enemy forces had been defeated in a region, that region must remain cleared so that refugees could return home and rebuilding projects could begin.

Representatives from the British Military Mission "violently opposed" Van Fleet's plan, urging instead that initial offensives should be aimed at cutting the guerrilla supply lines from the Soviet satellite countries. Van Fleet persuaded the GGS to adopt his plan." The Greek armed forces' first spring operation was an offensive in central Greece.



#### F. OPERATION PYRAVLOS

Operation Pyravlos, the offensive in central Greece, was the first campaign under Van Fleet's strategy. The operation began on 25 April with the GNA's blocking of the mountain passes that lead to northern Greece. On 5 May the main attack began.

DAG forces in the region responded by dividing into groups of 80-120 men. These groups attempted to avoid contact with the GNA advancing units. They would then reemerge once the GNA forces moved further north.

The GNA, however, was in no hurry to rush north. "A" Corps, rather than relying on massed formations and firepower, copied the guerrillas' tactics. The corps broke down into small units, hunting and pursuing the rebels. Most importantly, the local population now freely provided information to the GNA forces on the whereabouts of rebel bands. The operation consisted of dozens of skirmishes over three months rather than a few large, decisive battles. By the end of July, the corps had defeated the rebels in central Greece, the Thessaly region, and the southern Pindus mountains.<sup>79</sup> Operation Pyravlos marked the second consecutive successful operation of 1949.

#### G. OPERATION TORCH--THE FINAL CAMPAIGN

The success of Operation Pyravlos set the conditions for the final assault on DAG forces in the

Grammos-Vitsi region. Operation Torch began on 2 August, while the mopping-up phase of Operation Pyravlos continued.

DAG's situation in the summer of 1949 was grim. Zahariadis, reversing his stand on building a conventional force, attempted to revert to guerrilla warfare. He ordered that eight training centers located in satellite countries be shut down and the manpower from those camps be formed into guerrilla bands. These bands infiltrated into northern Greece, but failed to win the support of the local population. The Greek citizens reported these bands to government authorities. With this public support, NDC units and civil police were able to hunt the guerrillas down.<sup>80</sup>

Meanwhile, DAG forces in the Grammos-Vitsi area witnessed the GNA's build-up for Operation Torch. Zahariadis opted to fight from his defensive positions rather than pull back into Albania. His hope was to hold the terrain until winter, when the weather would once again halt any GNA offensive. DAG could then renew its efforts in the spring of 1950.<sup>81</sup>

The GNA launched Operation Torch with a diversionary attack on Grammos. The intent was to convince DAG to deploy its reserves to the Grammos area; the actual main attack would then be on Vitsi. The deception worked. With DAG reserves dispatched to

Grammos, the main attack began in Vitsi on 10 August. The Greek armed forces were victorious in five days.

After the fall of the Vitsi region, Zahariadis decided to continue to defend in Grammos. The GNA's final assault began on 25 August with the support of 50 Helldiver aircraft that the US had just delivered. The GNA overran the Grammos positions in three days. Sporadic fighting continued until the end of August while remnants of DAG forces escaped into Albania.

One week later, the Albanian head of state, Enver Hoxha, announced that any Greek citizen in his country would be disarmed and detained. Hoxha, gravely concerned about a Greek invasion, did not wish to offer the Greeks any legitimate excuse. Coupled with Yugoslavia's decision to cut off aid, Hoxha's announcement signified the end of the Greek Civil War.

#### VI. LESSONS FOR TODAY'S OPERATIONAL ARTIST

General Van Fleet and his JUSMAPG staff worked at the operational level of war. JUSMAPG composed campaign plans for the Greek military in 1948 and 1949 that attempted to achieve US strategic goals--the defeat of the Greek insurgency and the stabilization of the Greek government--with tactical actions. One of JUSMAPG's chief roles, then, was to achieve this link between strategy and tactics. JUSMAPG's experience in Greece demonstrates several lessons for future FID

missions.

First is the issue of leverage. Since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the United States put the Greek Civil War in terms of being part of a greater East-West conflict. The Greeks perceived that the United States was fully committed to winning the war. Therefore, the Greeks believed that the US would provide ever-increasing funds or would send American combat troops to Greece if the rebels appeared to be close to final victory. Greek soldiers, from the lowest to highest rank, did not feel the need to be aggressive. Why should they risk their lives when the US would eventually arrive and fight for them?<sup>62</sup>

US strategic policy thus had a negative impact on the tactical level of the Greek Civil War. US officials tried to instill an aggressive, fighting spirit in the Greek soldiers. They failed. The situation required an indigenous leader like General Papagos to perform this task. Papagos had the authority, power, and, above all, the iron will to force an end to the war.

The first lesson, then, is that the US must clearly state the limits of its involvement. The Truman Administration lost its leverage with Athens upon the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, which promised "to support free peoples who are resisting

attempted subjugation. . . ." There were no limits and no exceptions.<sup>83</sup> Compounding this problem was the decision not to inform the Greeks of the administration's aversion to send American combat forces even if a Communist takeover were imminent.

Secondly, US officials conducting a FID mission should actively search for competent officers to head the host nation's military. The talents of any senior US officers are necessary to win the respect of the host nation government, but on the battlefield such talents do not matter. Van Fleet could compose the greatest of campaign plans, but the Greek armed forces had to execute those plans. In the long run, a nation requires one of its own to spark the drive to victory. Papagos' aggressive leadership was a key to Greek success.

The retired Papagos was available throughout the Greek Civil War, but no one called upon him until the Greek government's situation turned bleak in late 1948. Both Greek and US officials identified him as the man who could energize the Greek military, but his appointment was held up for four months over concerns that another Metaxas-style dictatorship would emerge. US Ambassador Grady finally concluded that Papagos was necessary despite any threat to Greek democracy in order to instill efficiency in the Greek armed forces.

US officials, then, may need to tolerate a less than democratic form of government in the host nation in order to defeat an insurgency.

There is, therefore, a curious balancing act in counterinsurgency warfare. If an unstable, democratic government threatened by an insurgency continues to be inefficient, the population may turn to the guerrillas out of sheer desperation. If the government becomes too repressive in its attempts to be more efficient, the population may become alienated and give its support to the insurgency. US officers conducting a FID mission must be aware of this fine balance and act accordingly.

The key is to retain legitimacy. The US Army defines legitimacy as "the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make or carry out decisions."<sup>4</sup> The Greek government, therefore, needed the Greek people to grant it legitimacy in order for it to govern effectively. If the Greek population withdrew that legitimacy, then the government would have been more vulnerable to being overthrown.

The US mission in Greece, however, was also in need of legitimacy. The perception of many Greeks was that the East-West conflict was being fought on Greek soil. The US government needed the support of the

Greek people in order to accomplish its aims in its FID mission. JUSMAPG would not have accomplished its missions without the Greek people's acceptance of its authority in Greece.

In addition, the Greek government needed the legitimacy of the American public. If the American people withdrew their support of the Greek government, the US funding would cease. That legitimacy was at risk whenever an article appeared in the US press that described the Polk killing, the Greek government's corruption and ineptness, and the Greek's scandalous attempts to gain as much US aid as possible.

The operational artist, therefore, must be aware of such legitimacy issues. He must understand that the US FID mission requires the support of the host nation government and citizenry. He must also communicate to the host government that certain actions may cause a loss of US public support. The Greek government, however, appeared unconcerned, since the US government had strongly committed itself to defeating the Communists in Greece.

In addition to the issues of leverage and legitimacy, the operational artist may find himself providing advice on force structure issues of the host nation's military. One of the most important decisions the US made in the Greek Civil War was the

establishment of the National Defense Corps. These units, dedicated to static defense, allowed the GNA to conduct offensive operations. The creation of the NDC also provided a method for allowing the Greek citizens to defend themselves and their community. When these citizens conducted violent acts on behalf of their government, any link to the guerrillas weakened.<sup>85</sup>

The active support of the population, of course, is critical to the success of any counterinsurgency operation. The creation of the NDC battalions helped, but in many regions the Greek population did not feel secure. Once the Greek population became convinced that they were protected and that they were not subject to guerrilla retribution, they freely offered information to the GNA. This information played a key role in the GNA's successes in 1949. The mass arrests preceding the Peloponnese operation were certainly not in the best traditions of a democratic society. The arrests, however, were necessary for the people's sense of security, and thus necessary for the success of the operation.

## VII. CONCLUSION

The Greek Civil War offers a valid case study in US FID operations. As with any case study, the lessons here are not universal. However, many of these lessons can be applied in future FID missions.



First, the role of leverage and the need for defined limits of US involvement is critical. Since these limits may rule out the use of US combat force, US FID officials should encourage the host nation government to appoint the best indigenous leaders for the host nation's military. The key is to set the conditions for the indigenous forces, with US help, to defeat the insurgency themselves.

Secondly, operational artists in a FID mission must recognize the delicate balance involved in an insurgency situation. Both an inefficient, but democratic government and an efficient, but repressive regime can lose the population's support. The challenge is to be efficient without being too repressive.

In addition, legitimacy in a FID operation may involve more than just the relationship between the indigenous people and their government, but also the peoples and governments of other nations.

Finally, the operational artist should consider methods to not only protect the local population, but also encourage the people to participate in the counterinsurgency effort. The NDC battalions offered the Greek people the chance to defend themselves. Once the Greek government could assure the people's protection, the insurgency died.



## ENDNOTES

1. Data is from a review of the article listings in Air University Periodical Index (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Library), a publication that indexes articles from approximately 80 professional military journals. In the years immediately after the Greek Civil War (late 1949 through 1952) there were more articles on such topics as gliders, insurance, and the War of 1812 than on the US military involvement in Greece.
2. See US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992 (n.p., 1993), 29-54. This publication lists twenty terrorist groups as Communist, Marxist-Leninist, or Maoist.
3. D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 169.
4. History of the United States Army Group (Greece), Volume I, 44-45. Hereafter referred to as USAGG History.
5. Ibid., 51.
6. Cited in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 221.
7. John C. Campbell, et. al., The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948 (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 29.
8. Ibid., 29.
9. Quoted in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Volume IX, January 1 - December 31, 1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 649.
10. USAGG History, Volume I, 75-76.
11. Interestingly, Dwight Griswold answered directly to the Secretary of State, not to the US Ambassador in Greece. In 1948 Truman Administration officials realized the problems that this working arrangement created and made AMAG subordinate to the US ambassador.

12. Howard Jones, "A New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 72.

13. Estimated guerrilla strength was 18,000 by the summer of 1947, then grew to 25,000 by autumn. See Kolko, 406. Official US estimates assessed guerrilla strength at only 20,000 by the end of 1947 (see Campbell, 472). The fact remains, however, that the guerrilla strength increased sharply despite the announced US aid effort.

14. See Alexander Papagos, "Guerrilla Warfare," Foreign Affairs, January 1952, 223-225.

15. See USAGG History, Volume I, 59; USAGG History, Volume II, 1; and Jones, 65. John C. Campbell states that these amnesty programs failed due to "Communist discipline and control" over the guerrillas. See Campbell, 476.

16. See History of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), 28, (hereafter referred to as JUSMAPG History) and USAGG History, Volume II, 12, 14-15.

17. See US Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, Volume I, 1947 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983), 93-96. (Hereafter referred to as PPS).

18. After Griswold's initial suggestion that USAGG begin to offer operational advice to the Greek armed forces, the US War Department sent Major General S. J. Chamberlin on a fact-finding trip to Greece. Chamberlin returned in full support of the proposal to provide to Greek tactical units US observers "with the duties of energizing operational action, restoring the offensive spirit and advising on planning and operations." See "Report of MG S. J. Chamberlin to CSA (Eisenhower), 20 October 1947," in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume V, The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), 376-377. (Hereafter referred to as FRUS).

19. Campbell, 476-477.

20. Telegram, Secretary of State (Marshall) to the American Mission for Aid to Greece (Griswold), 26 January 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 36-37. General Livesay was initially to continue his logistical duties in

Greece. At Livesay's request, however, he was reassigned to the United States since the Greek officials would have perceived him as being disgraced.

Van Fleet, born in 1892, graduated from the United States Military Academy (West Point) in 1915. In World War II he served as a regimental commander in 4th Infantry Division during the Normandy landings. He went on to command at the division and corps level.

21. Quoted in Jones, 136.

22. Ibid., 157.

23. See Ibid., 137, 157-158. Compounding Van Fleet's problems was the challenge of coordinating with the British in Greece. The British had five agencies operating in Greece that were independent of each other, requiring Van Fleet or his staff to deal with all five. Such coordination was necessary in order for the Americans and the British military missions to present a unified opinion to the Greek authorities.

24. Jones, 152-153, and Papagos, 222. During the winter of 1946-1947, the Greek army began a program to identify Communist sympathizers within its ranks and to place them in special camps. Known as Category "C" personnel, these soldiers received instruction on the evils of Communism. Once Greek army officials were convinced that a soldier had repudiated Communist ideology, that soldier was returned to a regular unit.

25. "A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," NSC 5/2, 12 February 1948, 7-8. The council studied four options: first, to send a "token armed force" to Greece; second, to send a force necessary to prevent a Communist victory (size unspecified); third, to strengthen the US military posture in the Mediterranean area outside of Greece; and, fourth, to initiate a partial mobilization as a demonstration of US resolve.

26. "War Risks in Greek-Aid Plans," The United States News-World Report, 5 March 1948, 30-31. The article stated that commitment was "unlikely any time soon" unless both the US Congress and the United Nations sanctioned such a deployment. Although the use of US combat troops would be "a last resort," the article stated that if the GNA failed, US servicemen "may go back into combat before the year's end."

27. Quoted in Jones, 108, 110. Other senior US State Department officials echoed the same theme, warning Greece that it must defend itself and not rely too much on US assistance. See, for example, FRUS, 1948, 54. In a February, 1948 speech, Loy Henderson, Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, stated that "it would be extremely difficult for the United Nations or any member of the United Nations to save Greece" should the Greeks themselves falter in their own defense. In a private conversation, a Greek official questioned Henderson about the remark. Henderson replied that Greece had to defend itself. The US would help, he added, but the American public perception was that Greece was not doing all it could to save itself.

28. "War Risks in Greek-Aid Plans," The United States News-World Report, 5 March 1948, 30-31.

29. Time, 5 April 1948, 26.

30. Jones, 123 and 137.

31. Ibid., 156.

32. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Action Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegen), 26 December 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 466. Comments are General Livesay's.

33. JUSMAPG History, 23.

34. J. C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War," in T. N. Greene, ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him: Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette (New York: Praeger, 1962), 94-95.

35. Jones, 160.

36. JUSMAPG History, 59-79.

37. For a more detailed account of the Polk murder, see Jones, 161-167, and Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, By Fire and Axe (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1978), 265-266.

38. Averoff, 266.

39. "A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to the Use of U.S. Military Power in Greece," NSC 5/4, 3 June 1948, 2, 5-6. The National Security Council noted that the GNA had improved

considerably. In addition, US intelligence had indications of an emerging rift between Markos and the USSR. The NSC's conclusion was that Soviet policy had changed; the Kremlin no longer wanted to place Markos in power, but did wish to use the DAG to drain US economic strength.

40. Telegram, Griswold to Secretary of State, 16 June 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 107-108.

41. JUSMAPG History, 84.

42. Averoff, 282.

43. Ibid., 281.

44. Ibid., 290.

45. Some in the US State Department even suggested that the US could begin looking at reducing the Greek armed forces. A spirited debate, through telegrams and memorandums, about possible reductions of the Greek armed forces after the Grammos operation is in FRUS, 1948, 125-143.

46. Averoff, 292.

47. JUSMAPG History, p. 100.

48. Ibid., 102.

49. Ibid., 102-103.

50. Ibid., 103.

51. Ibid., 104.

52. See PPS, 1948, 499. In March, 1948, the estimated guerrilla strength was 26,400; in November, it was 24,500.

53. Jones, 184.

54. PPS, 1948, 518.

55. Averoff, 298.

56. See FRUS, 1948, 168-170, 190. Grady also believed it necessary to wage a propaganda campaign directed at Greek government officials and at the Greek people to convince them that the guerrilla war was a Greek problem, that there were limits to US assistance, and

that the Greeks themselves must redouble their efforts to end the war.

57. US News and World Report, 29 October 1948, 24.
58. JUSMAPG History, 165.
59. Time, 31 January 1949, 27.
60. FRUS, 1948, 176.
61. Ibid., 186-187.
62. JUSMAPG History, 119.
63. Ibid., 126.
64. Ibid., 120.
65. FRUS, 1949, 246.
66. FRUS, 1947, 425.
67. Murray, 101.
68. See Averoff, 311-312, and JUSMAPG History, 135-137.
69. JUSMAPG History, 136.
70. USAGG History. Vol III, 6.
71. Averoff, 325-326.
72. Ibid., 315-316. The proposal also called for the removal of all foreign military forces, foreign missions, and foreign influences from Greece.
73. Ibid., 317.
74. Jones, 190 and 200. See also Constantine Poulos, "Greece: Betrayal as Usual," Nation, 29 October 1949, 412.
75. Jones, 200.
76. Poulos, 412.
77. Averoff, 278-279. Averoff maintains that Tito was in the process of cutting off the DAG even before Zahariadis' policy announcement. Tito's rift with the Soviet Union forced him to look to the West for help in



rebuilding his economy. In addition, Averoff argues, Tito was convinced that the Greek guerrillas were about to lose the war anyway. This perception is in sharp contrast to those of US and Greek officials, who believed that the rebels still had the opportunity to win.

78. JUSMAPG History, 132-133.

79. Averoff, 336-338.

80. Ibid., 338-339.

81. Ibid., 339-340.

82. There were leverage problems in the political realm as well. AMAG officials had great difficulty convincing the Greek government to institute prudent tax policies, bureaucratic reforms, and civil rights policies. The Greeks understood that US threats to cut off economic aid were mere bluffs since the US was too committed to the Greek cause to back out. For examples of this lack of leverage, see Shafer, 185-192.

83. Truman Administration officials did narrow the scope of the Truman Doctrine soon after its announcement. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the doctrine would apply only on a case-by-case basis and only in those situations in which "assistance by the United States would be effective in meeting the problems of that country." The situation in Greece, of course, continued to meet these standards. Acheson was attempting to ease Congressional concerns that Truman's policy would require the US to become involved in every conflict, such as the civil war in China. See Dennet and Turner, 653.

84. US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993) p. 13-4. This manual holds that legitimacy is a principle of operations other than war (OOTW), and that FID is a type of OOTW.

85. Peter Paret and John W. Shy, "Guerrilla Warfare and U.S. Military Policy: A Study," in Greene, 52.

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